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Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel
Raoul Berger*
In retrospect a prolonged debate about a fine legal point
may resemble not a little the theological disputes of the Church
Fathers so quizzically described by Gibbon. Yet historians of
ideas attribute the trustworthiness of scientific findings to the
fact that they are challengeable and often are challenged by
others.1 One who has served in an adjudicatory capacity or has
submitted a series of briefs to a court knows that those who sit
in judgment often value clarification of arguments that are not as
glittering as they may at first appear. Frequently, too, the agile
shifts of a hard-pressed advocate require the eye of one steeped
in the intricacies if attention is to be riveted on core determinants. Let this serve as my apology for continuing my debate
with Professor Kenneth Culp2 Davis concerning judicial review of
administrative arbitrariness.
The debate involves two main issues: 1) whether the direction of section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3
that courts "shall

.

. set aside agency action . . . found to be

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law" was curtailed by the introductory ex*
1.

2.

Member, Illinois and District of Columbia Bars.
MULLER, USES OF THE PAST 32 (1952).
In sequence: Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judi-

cial Review, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 55 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger,
Article]; 4 DAvis, ADvn isTT.AEv
LAw TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as Davis, Comment]; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 783 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as Berger, Reply]; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 814 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as

Davis, Final Word]; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder
to ProfessorDavis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REv. 816 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Rejoinder]; Davis, Administrative ArbitrarinessA Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. Rzv. 823 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Davis,

Postscript].
I shall not quibble with Professor Davis about the meaning of "review." Davis, Postscript 823 n.1. In the exercise of "jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction," even "discretion" is "reviewable" for the purpose of determining whether there is jurisdiction to go further. If, on
such preliminary "review," it is determined that discretion was reasonably exercised, there is no room to go further. On the other hand, when
a preliminary review reveals unreasonable and oppressive exercise of
delegated power, a second determination is made that the action must
be set aside. It is in this second sense that I have used the word "review," and in this second sense it does not apply to the reasonable
exercise of delegated power.
3. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
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ception of section 10 for action "by law committed to agency
discretion," as Professor Davis maintains; 4 and 2) if that direction was so curtailed, what are the criteria for determining
when "discretion" is "by law committed" so as to insulate arbitrariness from review. Professor Davis' "Final Word" was relatively restrained, but, emboldened by an editorial assurance that
his would be the last word, 5 he let fly with a ballooned "Postscript" replete with distortions, misleading statements, and denigrating charges which must be answered. Such grave deficiencies of scholarship constrain one to follow the example set
by Professor Davis in his scathing indictment of Dean Pound,
and to point out his own egregious "disservice to sound scholarship."'6 When flaying Dean Pound, Professor Davis built large
accusations on what were relatively minor flaws when compared
with his own shortcomings. Uncritical citation of his work makes
it necessary to dwell on those shortcomings, and to emphasize
that his "Papal Bulls" must be carefully examined.
The "Postscript" does, however, serve a useful purpose, for
without acknowledging the fact, Professor Davis now retreats
from several extreme and indefensible positions that he at first
dogmatically asserted, and these retreats manifest the intrinsic weakness of his position. Further, in his "Postscript" Professor Davis at last makes a brave show of meeting the issues,
so that opposing considerations can now be lined up and evaluated. Such evaluation may begin with the constitutional argument.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

The reader of Professor Davis' argument under this heading
would conclude that Berger's argument lies in the realm of pure
assertion, for Davis focuses exclusively on "Berger statements"
with never a reference to a Berger citation nor an intimation
that Berger has called a row of Supreme Court declarations to
4. The relevant portions of § 10 read as follows:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion ...
(e) [the court shall] ... (B) hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law ....
5. ,Editor's Note, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1966).
6. Davis, Dean Pound's Errors About"Administrative Agencies, 42
COLum. L. REV. 804 (1942). See also Berger, Reply 784.
One who ventures to differ with Professor Davis finds himself involuntarily embattled. Though not a pejorative word or epithet will
be found in my initial Article, the Davis Comment, an eminent spectator
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his support.7 Because the "case law," Davis claims, "is overwhelTningly in support of [his] position," it will be useful to
line up the opposing positions, bearing the "overwhelmingly" in
mind, for it is by such demonstrably overblown statements that
Professor Davis' judgment can be tested.
A.

THE BERGER PosriToN

The Supreme Court has epitomized "due process" as the "protection of the individual against arbitrary action."9 In addition,
other Supreme Court statements were cited in my prior writings.
(1) Our institutions "do not mean to leave room for the play and
action of purely personal and arbitrary power."'10 (2) The Constitution condemns "all arbitrary exercise of power."" (3) "The
delegated power, of course, may not be exercised arbitrarily
"12
(4) The Court would not leave an individual "to the
suggested, could have been less bruising. Gellhorn, Administrative Law
Treatise, 1965 Pocket Parts, 52 A.B.A.J. 272, 273 (1966). I make no
complaint about "bruises" that do not result from low blows. In another review of Davis' Pocket Parts, Hesse states that "the tone of
Davis' discussion rejecting Clark's and Westwood's substantive objecsuggests unfortunate intolerance of constructive criticism.
tions ...
The 1965 Pocket Parts treatment of Berger . . . does not resolve my
uneasiness on this score." 54 CALI. L. REv. 1392, 1403 n.68 (1966).

7.

Compare Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action":

A Review, 66 COLum. L. REv. 635, 672 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as Davis

on Jaffe]:
What I find especially dismaying is that Jaffe refuses to alter

his 48-page chapter, which still relies exclusively on the analytical approach, despite the existence of a large body of Supreme
Court law which does not use that approach. This, in my judgment, is deeply unsound, and it is hard to understand why he
refuses to repair the unsoundness.
When the reader compares the Supreme Court citations that will now
be set forth with the negative implications Davis would wrest from
cases, ignoring the positive Court pronouncements, the reader may be
no less "dismayed."
8. Davis, Postscript 831. (Emphasis added.)
9. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302
(1937). It is an established principle that an arbitrary application of
a statute is unconstitutional. Citations in Berger, Article 73 nn.96-97.
Speaking of the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the constitution of Maryland, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land, Justice William Johnson said, "they were intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government
....
" Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
See also Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410 (1932). Compare quotation from The Japanese Immigrant Case, note 152 infra.
10. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
11. ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913).
12. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965). In Giaccio v. Penn-
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absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of ...
[an] admintrative officer. . .. ,,13 (5) A state governor's "order may not

stand if it is an act of mere oppression, an arbitrary fiat that
overleaps the bounds of judgment."'14 (6) "[T]here is no place in
our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary powers.
. . ."15
Such utterances clearly furnish evidence of a constitutional doctrine that arbitrariness is reviewable.
B. THE DAVIS PosrrIoN
In support of his assertion that "The case law is overwhelmingly in support of [his] position," Professor Davis states:
For instance, when an officer was buying steel for the government, the Supreme Court in holding that the officer's determination was not judicially reviewable did not even mention
the possibility
that a constitutional question might be involved.' 6
Nonmention of a "constitutional question" in a case affords a
dubious base upon which to build constitutional doctrine. Repeatedly, for example, the Court has rejected arguments that
the issue of jurisdiction was settled because the Court had proceeded in earlier cases without noticing it. 17

Professor Davis

himself criticized Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.18 because it overlooked important constitutional considerations. 19 It is therefore
sylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), a Pennsylvania statute authorizing a jury

to impose costs of criminal prosecution on a defendant acquitted of a
misdemeanor charge was held "invalid under the Due Process Clause
because of vagueness and the absence of any standards sufficient to enbale defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary and discriminatory impositions of costs." Id. at 402. In other words, one may not be
deprived of protection against arbitrariness.
13. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94, 110 (1902).
14. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 446 (1935) (summary
of Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) by Cardozo, J., dissenting).
15. Garfield v. United States ex tel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262
(1908). Professor Davis professes to "share" my "passionate belief" in
this statement. Davis, Final Word 815. Despite the above-quoted statements, Professor Davis maintains that Berger's "position is not at all
supported by constitutional doctrine." Davis, Postscript 831. (Emphasis
added.)
16. Davis, Postscript 831. (Emphasis added.) The case referred
to is Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
17. Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132, 137 n.2
(1947); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805).
18. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
19. "The Court was forgetting that even when the government is
acting in a proprietary capacity it is still subject to constitutional limitations." 1 DAvis, ADmisTRATVE LAw TREATISE § 7.12, at 456 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as DAvis, TREATISE]. At another point he stated,

The Court is going too far when it says that the government
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an unenviable feat to derive from nonmention of the constitutional issue in Perkins the proposition that arbitrariness cannot be challenged on constitutional grounds. 20 It exhibits a
singular taste in "authorities" to single out the nonmention of
the constitutional issue in Perkins while ignoring affirmative
statements that arbitrariness is unconstitutional.
Another case invoked by Professor Davis is Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Bd.,21 which, he declares, "held administrative discretion unreviewable.

' 22

Were this the fact, it

would still beg the question whether "abuse of discretion" is also
unreviewable. Professor Davis persists in ignoring the fact that
"discretion" and "abuse of discretion" are opposites, and that the
former does not include the latter, as courts have repeatedly
stated and as Congress made clear.23 Then too, since review of
arbitrariness is the rule-as section 10 (e)demonstrated afreshand since his "solution" at most seeks selective unreviewability
in the exceptional case where prior "law" allegedly so required, 24
it is incumbent upon him to point to the reasoning or factors in
Switchmen's which indicate that the Court departed from the
norm. Blandly to equate a holding that "discretion" is not reviewable with a decision that "abuse of discretion" is not reviewable falls far short of proof that the Court so held.
In fact, no issue of arbitrariness was presented. As the
Court later explained, Switchmen's "involved a question of stathas "unrestricted power" to determine the conditions upon

which it will deal. For instance, the government may not dis-

criminate against racial or religious groups in buying goods ....
4 DAVIS, TREATISE § 28.06, at 26. For an example of invalid nonreligious
and nonracial discrimination in this area, see Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also Berger,
Article 55 n.2.
20. The Court held that the plaintiffs had no "standing" to challenge an administrative interpretation because the government has "an
unrestricted power ...to determine those with whom it will deal ......
310 U.S. at 127, 132. The theory of "standing" is that "the court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the validity of the governmental action." 3
DAvIs, TREATISE § 22.01, at 209. A decision that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide is quite different from a decision on the substantive
question of whether the plaintiff has a constitutional right which is
entitled to protection. Professor Davis thwacked the decision lustily:

the case is of "questionable soundness," the Court has since "backtracked," etc. 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.07, at 32; 1 DAvis, TREATIsE § 7.12,
at 456.
21.
22.
23.
24.

320 U.S. 297 (1943).
Davis, Postscript 831.
See §§ II & III infra.
Davis, Comment 21; Berger, Reply 810.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 51:601

utory construction," 25 and mistaken interpretations of law are
not indicia of arbitrariness. 2 6 Arbitrariness patently played no
role in the case. Equally clearly, no constitutional issue was presented in Switchmen's, for the Court stated "all constitutional
questions aside, it is for Congress to determine how the rights
which it creates shall be enforced." 27 Finally Switchmen's, says
the Davis Treatise, is "much the most important case holding
that a statute inexplicitly precluded review," 28 i.e., the case comes
within the first exception of section 10, where "statutes preclude
judicial review." rt is under this heading that the Davis Treatise
discusses Switchmen's. 29 The case is not even mentioned in the
discussion of the second exception, pertaining to "action committed by law to agency discretion."3' From this it may be inferred that in a more dispassionate moment Professor Davis
thought Switchmen's entirely irrelevant to the "discretion" exception.
The last case cited by Professor Davis to show that "the
case law is overwhelmingly in support of [his] position"3' is
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of NonContract Employees,32 another inexplicit statutory preclusion
case which expressly relied on Switchmen's. Apparently invoking Leedom v. Kyne,3 3 a case subsequent to Switchmen's, United
Airlines contended "that Switchmen's Union does not control a
claim that the [National Mediation] Board has ignored an express
command of the Act. '34 The Court, however, found that "the
contention is completely devoid of merit."3 5 In short, an alleged
error in the Board's interpretation of law was challenged, and
the Court concurred with the Board. Absent arbitrariness there
was of course no need to discuss the constitutional issue that
25. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of
Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 658-59 (1965).
26. "Merely to decide a question of law incorrectly is certainly not
an abuse of discretion." Ex parte Tokio bMrine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d
113, 115 (5th Cir. 1963).
27. 320 US. at 301.

28. 4 DAVIs, TREATIsE § 28.09, at 42.
29. Ibid. Whether Congress can deprive the courts of jurisdiction
to hear claims that constitutional guarantees are invaded remains to be
decided. See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d
Cir. 1948); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Ray. 1362 (1953).
30. 4 DAvis, TREATIsE § 28.16, at 80.
31. Davis, Postscript 831.

32. 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
33. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
34.

380 U.S. 650, 661 (1965).

35. Ibid.
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might be presented by an attempt to foreclose review of arbitrariness.
Perkins, Switchmen's, and Brotherhood are the "overwhelming" proof cited by Professor Davis in support of his "position
...that some administrative discretion is unreviewable for arbitrariness or abuse ... under the Constitution. 30 The transformation of such tenuous, farfetched inferences into "overwhelming" proof shakes confidence in his judgment. And what
is one to say about reliance on such "proof" when it is accompanied by willful failure to comment upon a line of clearly opposed Supreme Court statements? 37 That an omission to notice
a point that calls for notice is a sin which is high in the Davis
decalogue is revealed by his recent critique of Professor Jaffe,
wherein Jaffe is charged with no less than fourteen such omissions. 38 For example: "He [Jaffe] simply looks the other way
and pretends that the large body of law does not exist, even
after it has been pointed out to him. And he offers no explanation for ignoring it." 39 Measured by his own yardstick, Professor
40
Davis falls short of what he would require from others.
36. Davis, Postscript 831.
37. Professor Davis also cites § 28.19 of his Treatise, but I assume
that he selected his best cases for discussion. See notes 9-15 supra and
accompanying text; cf. note 165 inira.
38. Davis on Jaffe, 645, 646, 647, 649, 650, 652, 656, 657, 659, 663, 670
(twice), 671, 677.
39. Id. at 670. "The large body of law represented by the eleven
cases is the body of law which Professor Jaffe refuses to recognize. He
does not conclude that it is unsound. He gives no reason for rejecting
it. He simply ignores it." Id. at 671. "Especially unfortunate, in my
opinion, is his failure to let his readers know about the sixth of my
items ....

."

Id. at 677.

40. One of the Davis' strictures is especially pertinent: the criticism of Jaffe for failure to follow Davis' interpretation of the legislative
history bearing on the words "adversely affected" in § 10 of the APA.
Id. at 668-69. In my article which touched off the Berger-Davis debate,
I made a detailed analysis of this history and the Davis interpretation,
and was constrained to conclude that his interpretation was faulty.
Berger, Article 84-87. Before twitting Jaffe for nonacceptance or failure to notice the Davis interpretation, it might be thought that Davis
would take account of my recent criticism of his view.
For other examples of Davis' persistent neglect to take account of
unpalatable facts at about the time that he was berating Jaffe for such
failures, see Berger, Reply 790, 792; Berger, Rejoinder 819, 820, 821.
Professor Bailey, who rose to the defense of Dean Pound against Davis'
attack, commented on Davis' "own agility in avoiding contact with
unpleasant facts." Bailey, Dean Pound and Administrative Law-Another View, 42 COLum. L. Rav. 781, 802 (1942).
Finally, because Davis had repeatedly belabored me with "the
cases," see Berger, Reply 794-95, I devoted eight pages to painstaking
analysis of his citations and demonstrated that they did not bear the
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THE STATUTORY WORDS

The necessity for Professor Davis' interpretive panacea (of
which more anon) springs, he would have us believe, from the
confusion of terms on the face of the statute-the words are allegedly "unclear." My demonstration that the confusion is of his
own making provoked the statement, "I can hardly believe my
eyes, because I had supposed that no reasonable person could
find the words clear.141 Since Professor Davis would not question that he is a "reasonable person," I shall avouch him to witness. In his original "Comment," addressing himself to my "mistaken" denial "that administrative arbitrariness or abuse of discretion is sometimes unreviewable," he stated that "the words of
[section 10 of] the Administrative Procedure Act are so clear that
occasion for doubting their meaning seems surprising....
When the statutory language is so clear, resort to legislative
42
history should be unnecessary."
But since those statements constitute at best only a plea in
mitigation, let me not glide over my own "unreason." To demonstrate my "unreason" Professor Davis telescopes the second exception of section 10 with section 10(e): "Except so far as ...
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion . . . the
reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency action . . . found to
be ... an abuse of discretion," and asks "Is the provision clear
or unclear?" 43 He answers that it is unclear because "the exception consumes the whole power of the court, so that whenever the agency has discretion the court is prohibited from setting aside an abuse of discretion." 44 On his "literal" reading,
which wraps "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" in one skin,
that result would certainly follow. 45 His "literal" reading proceeds from an assumption that "abuse of discretion" is embraced
within "discretion," so that an exception for "discretion" also
interpretation he put upon them. Id. at 796-804. His reply was short:
"Mr. Berger quarrels with some of my interpretations, but after reading
his argument I find no reason to change any of them." Davis, Final
Word 814. Why should he then object to an equally Olympian reply
by Professor Jaffe?
41. Davis, Postscript 823.
42. Davis, Comment 18. See also his remark in text accompanying
note 58 infra.
43. Davis, Postscript 823-24.
44. Ibid.
45. Initially he stated that the courts "unanimously" read the
clause "literally." See text accompanying note 58 infra. Under the
impact of my criticism he has tempered his claim; now the "literal"
meaning is what "I [Davis] consider to be a literal interpretation."
Davis, Postscript 823.
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excepts the "abuse." But that assumption, I have demonstrated,
runs counter to judicial practice and to the intention of Congress,
and is repelled by the face of the statute. Only Professor Davis'
invincible dogmatism enables him to persist in lodging "abuse
of discretion" within "discretion" without so much as a reference to my demonstration that his view is untenable. 46 If my
extended analysis is mistaken, he owes his readers an explanation.
To begin with the face of the statute, section 10(e) states
that "abuse of discretion" is "not in accordance with law. 4 7 The
second exception of section 10 is for action "by law committed to
agency discretion."48 Congress manifestly did not "by law" commit to agency discretion action which it stated was "not in accordance with law." Thus the face of the statute itself makes it
"clear" that the "discretion" exception was not designed to impinge on the directive to set aside "abuse of discretion." Further,
for Congress and for the courts, even prior to the APA, "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" were opposites. One posits the
reasonable exercise of delegated power; the other, unreason and
oppression. 49 One is lawful; the other is not, as section 10 itself
makes plain. Chairman Walter, referring to the phrase "by law
committed to agency discretion," said that agencies "do not have
authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily,"0 again
showing that the exception for "discretion" was not meant to
affect the section 10(e) direction to set aside "abuse of discretion." Walter's view reflected that of the courts. The differentiation was sharply drawn in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 51 where the
46. See Berger, Article 61-62; notes 51-55 infra and accompanying

text.
47. Emphasis added.
48. Emphasis added.
49. "This court can and should insure that the agency stays within
the bounds of reason and outside the realm of caprice .... " North
Cent. Airlines v. CAB, 265 F.2d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
50. Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History, S. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1946). (Emphasis added.) [hereinafter
cited as S. Doc. No. 248]. Walter was chairman of the subcommittee
that handled the APA for the House Committee on the Judiciary. It is
worth noting that the veteran Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-

mittee, Congressman Celler stated in 1963, during discussion of a bill,
that

Under the Administrative Procedure Act all agency action is
subject to review except where specifically precluded by statute or where it is "by law committed to agency discretion,"
5 U.S.C. § 1009(a). However, again, the possibility of judicial
review of arbitrary or capricious decisions would be present.
88 Cong. Rec. 14992 (1963).
51. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Supreme Court condemned an ordinance that conferred
not a discretion . ..

but a naked arbitrary power to give or

withhold consent ....
The power given to them is not confined to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is
granted to their mere will. It is purely arbitrary .... 52
That distinction has frequently been reiterated: "discretion . . .
means sound discretion, not discretion exercised arbitrarily"; 53
an arbitrary finding "is outside the administrative discretion
conferred by statute"; 54 an officer "exceeds his authority by making a determination which is arbitrary or capricious."5 5 So one
who concludes that "discretion" does not comprehend "abuse of
discretion," as both the courts and Chairman Walter emphasized,
has not, Professor Davis to the contrary notwithstanding, taken
leave of his senses.
Professor Davis employs the statutory setting to expose "the
kind of thinking Mr. Berger uses in attacking" him: Berger unjustly "leads the reader to believe that I [Davis] both favor and
oppose a literal reading of the same provision."5 0 The contradiction is in fact so glaring as to cry out for explanation; instead
Davis substitutes a red herring, as a quick survey of the facts
will disclose. The point merits examination, for it illustrates
once again Davis' unfortunate incapacity to confess error. Once
he has taken a position, he seems driven to maintain it at all
costs.
In his "Comment," Professor Davis repeatedly charged me
with rejecting a "literal" reading of the "except" clause, which
allegedly the courts "unanimously" read "literally. '5 7 He stated
that:
One clear expression of Congress in favor of preventing review
is the provision of § 10 of the APA allowing review "except
so far as ...

agency action is by law committed to agency

discretion." Unlike Mr. Berger, the courts uniformly read this
provision literally, because they believe that Congress intended
what it so clearly said ....

In sum, the courts reject the

Berger view mainly because they allow Congress to govern on
52. Id. at 366-67.
53. Smaldone v. United States, 211 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1954).
54. United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715,
719 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 172 (1936). See Fox
Film Corp. v. Trumbull, 7 F.2d 715, 727 (D. Conn. 1925), "The use of
the words 'within the discretion of the commission' does not import
absolute and capricious discretion."; Markall v. Bowles, 58 F. Supp. 463,
465 (N.D. Cal. 1944); note 49 supra. For additional citations see Berger,
Reply 61 n.33.
56. Davis, Postscript 824-25; see text accompanying note 61 infra.
57. Davis, Comment 25; Berger, Reply 787.
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this subject.58
As he correctly notes, I said that "this is utterly misleading .. .
as I shall prove by the Professor's own words."5 9 Those words
were:
The literal language says that a court shall set aside an abuse
of discretion except so far as the agency may exercise discretion. But this makes neither grammatical sense nor practical
sense, for the exception consumes the whole power of the reviewing court ....60
This is true if the validity of the Davis "literal" reading is assumed. To take the curse off this manifest contradiction-between belaboring me for rejecting a "literal" reading and maintaining that such a reading makes no sense-Professor Davis now
lamely charges that
without saying that he [Berger] is moving from a discussion of
the "except" clause to a discussion of a combination of the
"except" clause and a part of subsection (e), he quotes me as
saying that the literal language makes neither grammatical nor
practical sense. He thus leads the reader to believe that I both
favor and oppose a literal reading of the same provision.61
Beyond doubt, Professor Davis is caught in the coils of just that
contradiction, and his "combination" argument seeks to obscure
rather than explain the fact.
From the beginning, Davis' argument was built on the "combination." The categorical, unqualified section 10(e) directive
to set aside arbitrariness leaves no room for selective unreviewability. The issue is whether the operation of section 10(e) was
curtailed by the "except" clause, and his entire "literal" interpretation argument was designed to rebut my view that the
clause left section 10(e) untouched. It constituted his opening
salvo to bolster his answer of "no" to "the two questions of (1)
whether the Berger position is the law and, (2) whether it ought
to be the law. ' 62 He invoked the "except" clause as a "clear
expression of Congress in favor of preventing review" to explain
why "the courts reject the Berger view."6 3 That is why he
drummed away that the courts "uniformly" read the "except"
clause "literally"6 4 and "uniformly give full effect to the literal
words of the 'except' clause." 65 The Supreme Court, he stated,
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Davis, Comment 25. (Emphasis added.)
Davis, Postscript 824, quoting from Berger, Reply 787.
Davis, Comment 21. (Emphasis added.)
Davis, Postscript 824-25.
Davis, Comment 17.
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
Davis, Comment 25.
rd. at 17.
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"reads that clause literally, interpreting it according to the face
value of its words," meaning that if Congress "has left ['a matter'] to the discretion of the administrators," it is unreviewable.60 Berger alone "rejects a literal interpretation of the ['except' clause] provision of § 10."67 If all this was without bearing
on section 10(e), if it was not being employed by Davis in
"combination," it was utterly pointless. The fact is that he resorted to the "except" clause to curtail the sweep of section 10(e),
and that he read the two in "combination."
The crucial question, to which no reply has been made, is
how Professor Davis can, in good conscience, argue that a "literal" reading of the "except" clause curtails across-the-board reviewability of arbitrariness under section 10(e), and simultaneously declare that when the "except" clause is read in "combination" with section 10(e) it makes no sense. Whether or not I
sufficiently emphasized that Professor Davis was referring to
the "combination," the disastrous effect of that declaration upon
his reiterated insistence on a "literal" reading is not altered.0 8
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id. at 25.
68. Professor Davis has not yet sorted out his ideas. At the outset
of his "Postscript" he states, "The introductory clause of section 10 says
in part: 'Except so far as . . . agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion. . . .' I think these words are clear, and I have

pointed out that the courts have consistently given them what I consider to be a literal interpretation." Davis, Postscript 823. In fact,
however, Professor Davis does not really rely on a "literal" reading, but
rather on a "practical solution" of a "difficult" interpretative problem.
See Berger, Reply 791; Davis, Postscript 825; § IV infra.
But Professor Davis persists in playing ducks and drakes with the
"literal" argument. Witness the admission he would wring in his "Postscript" from my early statement that
on a literal reading the exception of "discretion" at the outset
of Section 10 may be thought to exempt "abuse of discretion"
and "arbitrary" action from review. But such a reading must
be rejected because it produces unreasonable consequences ....
Berger, Article 58. "May be thought" is tentative, and it is not equivalent to a categorical assertion of my belief, particularly when such a
"literal" reading is patently unreasonable, as Professor Davis agrees.
But being less reluctant than he to acknowledge that I can modify early
expressions in the light of more mature study, I admitted in my "Reply,"
after setting out a comprehensive basis for my view that "discretion"

and "abuse of discretion" are "opposites" and were so considered by

courts and Congress, that
though my article pointed out that Congress had these differences in mind, I did not sufficiently emphasize that Davis'
"literal" reading turned on an assumption that Congress employed the statutory terms merely to represent different aspects
of the same thing, and I was for the moment, in fact, seduced
by his use of "literal."
Berger, Reply 788 n.30. Although my guarded early remark was thus
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The flaw is not in my "kind of thinking" but in the contradiction
in which Davis trapped himself. 69 Since he cannot adequately
explain that contradiction, he takes refuge in a specious intimation that I was unfair in not emphasizing that his rejection
of a "literal" reading rested on a "combination" of the "except"
clause and section 10 (e). That intimation is repelled by the fact
that self-evidently he built on the two of them in "combination"
in order to refute me, and the fact that his own statement 7o
discloses on its face that he had "moved" to a discussion of the
"combination," and that there was in consequence no need to
underscore the fact.
Before moving to the legislative history, let me summarize
the argument from the face of the statute, saving the Davis
gloss on "by law committed" for later discussion. The statute
employed terms which courts generally regarded as mutually exclusive: "discretion" was a reasonable exercise of delegated power
which did not comprehend "abuse of discretion," the oppressive,
unreasonable abuse of power. The judicial differentiation was
underscored by the section 10 (e) provision that "abuse of discretion" is "not in accordance with law" and therefore could not be
comprised in "discretion by law committed," for self-evidently
the "law" does not "commit" what is "unwarranted by law."
The legislative history abundantly confirms this, my "literal"
reading.
supplanted by the mature judgment expressed in my "Reply," Profes-

sor Davis employs the earlier remark to suggest that it represents my
view. He states in his "Postscript" that Berger "finds that the 'discretion' exception does not bar review of 'abuse of discretion,' a conclusion not warranted by a literal reading of the words, as Mr. Berger
himself asserts." Davis, Postscript 824.
69. Professor Davis also states that 'Mr. Berger repeatedly goes
wrong by reading portions of section 10 without taking into account the
'except' clause." He charges that Berger
says without qualification that section 10(e) expressly instructs
the courts to set aside action that is "arbitrary" or an "abuse
of discretion." In the act as written, what he quotes in these
passages is modified by the "except" clause which he completely ignores in such statements as I have quoted.
Davis, Postscript 829-30. Having shown that Davis himself considers
that under his "literal" reading the "exception consumes the whole
power," I had good reason to think that the "except" clause left subsection 10(e) unaffected. To the extent the Davis "solution" depends
on his "literal" reading, I did my duty when I demonstrated the untenability of that reading. It was not thereafter incumbent upon me to
restate my refutation every time I referred to subsection 10 (e), and
indeed such restatement would have been cumbersome and unnecessary.
70. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Originally Professor Davis erroneously charged me with suppression, with "choos [ing] materials [from the legislative history] on one side" and ignoring "the strongest part of it," which
allegedly "supports [Davis'] literal reading."7' 1 Originally he declared "the principal answer" to the question "why should not
the law be what [Berger] wants it to be" is that Congress gave
"clear expression ... in favor of preventing review" by "what it
so clearly said. ' 72 If our debate has accomplished nothing else,
it has caused Professor Davis to retreat from such vulnerable
positions. Now his purpose in presenting "the legislative history
opposed to Mr. Berger's position . . . is not to show that it
leads to a conclusion against Berger," but merely to "show that
it is conflicting." 73 Now the legislative history proffered by
Davis merely "seems to [him] rather substantial, just as the legislative history in support of Mr. Berger's view is rather substantial. 7 4 How "substantial" the respective histories are, the
reader may now judge for himself.

A. THE BERGER EVIDENCE FOR REVEwABILrY OF ARBITRARINESS
1. Referring to matters "by law committed to the absolute
discretion of administrative agencies," Chairman Walter said:
"They do not have authority in any case to act blindly or arbitrarily. '75
2. Early in the legislative process, it was "proposed that the
phrase 'by law committed to agency discretion' might be clarified
to indicate that judicial review is conferred only to correct an
'abuse of discretion granted by law.' ,,7 In other words, it was
feared that "discretion" as well as "abuse of discretion" would
be reviewable. The Senate committee concluded that "so far as
necessary, the matter may be explained by committee report, ' 77
thus exhibiting an understanding that the "committed" phrase
did not impinge on review of "abuse of discretion."
3. Both the Senate report and the House report stated that
it has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judicially confined
71.
72.
respect
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Davis, Comment 18; see Berger, Reply 792-93.
Davis, Comment 25. (Emphasis added.) This was said with
to the face of the statute; see text accompanying note 53 supra.
Davis, Postscript 826.
Id. at 827.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 368. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 36. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid.
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to the scope of the authority granted [arbitrariness is never
authorized] or to the objectives specified ["discretion" reasonably exercised as opposed to "abuse of discretion"]. Its policy
could not be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in
effect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board.7S

Least of all did Congress want to issue a "blank check" to be
arbitrary, which is exactly what the Davis plea that some arbitrariness must be unreviewable calls for.
4. Chairman Walter explained that the APA was meant
to be operative "across the board" in accordance with its
terms or not at all. Where one agency has been able to demonstrate that it should be exempted, all like agencies have
been exempted in general terms....

Where one agency has

shown that some particular operation should be exempted
from any particular requirement, the same function in all agenNo agency has been favored by species has been exempted.
79
cial treatment.

Translated into relevant terms, no agency or operation was exempted from the section 10(e) directive to set aside "abuse of
discretion." If a particular function was "intrinsically unsuited"
-the Davis criterion-to judicial review of arbitrariness, au such
functions would have been exempted. But the APA makes no
blanket exemption of any function from judicial review of arbitrariness. To invoke "by law committed" to preclude judicial
review is to invite a checkerboard of unreviewability turning on
the fortuitous drafting of primary agency statutes. So far as
such statutes precluded review, they were preserved by the first
exception of section 10 for preclusive statutes. One who would
cut down the avowed congressional "across the board" policy
needs a sharper blade than the amorphous "by law committed."
5. Both the Senate report and the House report state that
section 10(e) "lists the several categories of questions of law,"
among them "arbitrary" action and "abuse of discretion," that
"are for courts rather than agencies to decide."8' 0 And the House
report states that "in any case the existence of discretion does
not prevent a person from bringing a review action but merely
prevents him pro tanto from prevailing therein." 8' The "discretion" exception, in other words, does not bar review of "abuse
of discretion"; the litigant may obtain review, although he may
then fail to prove his complaint of arbitrariness.
78. Id. at 212, 275.
79. Id. at 250.

80. Id. at 213-14, 278 ("abuse of discretion" appears only in the
House version).
81. Id. at 275. (Emphasis added.)
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6. During the Senate debate, Senator Donnell asked whether a person who claims an abuse of discretion would be barred
from judicial review when the agency has "a discretion vested in
it by law." Chairman McCarran replied that judicial review
would be available "where an agency ... by caprice makes a
decision .... It must not be an arbitrary discretion."8' 2 Thus a

leading exponent of the APA explained that the exception for
"discretion" would not bar review for "abuse of discretion."
7. Immediately after the enactment of the APA, Chairman
McCarran explained to the American Bar Association that "committed 'by law' means, of course, that claimed discretion must
have been intentionally given to the agency by Congress, rather
than assumed by it

. .

."; and he added that "'abuse of discre-

tion' is expressly made reviewable [by section 10(e)]"88 once
more demonstrating that the "committed" phrase was not designed to curtail review of arbitrariness.
These citations unmistakably demonstrate that arbitrariness
was to be reviewable without qualification-in Chairman Walter's words, "in any case."

B. TiE DAVIS EVIDENCE AGAINST

REVEWABILTY OF ARBITRARINESS

Do the Davis citations to "the legislative history opposed to
Mr. Berger's position"8' 4 show that the phrase "by law committed
to agency discretion" was meant to curtail the section 10(e) mandate and to make some arbitrariness unreviewable? 5 It can be
categorically stated that nowhere in the legislative history will
be found the plea for selective unreviewability of arbitrariness
made by Professor Davis. It is entirely a product of his lucubrations. His citations, which follow, add up to little more than this:

82. Id. at 311. McCarran was Chairman of the Senate Committee

on the Judiciary. See Berger, Article 64.
83. McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice": Hearings and
Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A..B.A.J. 827, 831 (1946).
Explaining the "purpose" of the § 10(e) provision, Congressman

Springer said:

In those cases where these decisions are found to be arbitrary,
where the decision is found to be capricious or an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law, the decisions can be set aside. That is certainly fair, that is certainly
equitable, and that is certainly based upon a sound philosophy.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 377. Not one of those who spoke in such terms gave
the slightest intimation that their words were qualified by a reservation for selective instances of unreviewable arbitrariness, a fact for
which Professor Davis fails to account. See also Berger, Reply 788 n.31.
84. Davis, Postscript 826.
85. See text accompanying note 106 infra.
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"by law committed" means "by law committed," and "discretion" must be "preserved."
1. The Senate Committee said: "Section 10 on judicial review
does not apply in any situation so far as . . . agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion . . . . The basic exception of matters committed to agency discretion would apply
even if not stated at the outset."8 6
The "basic exception [which]. . . would apply even if not stated"
refers to the pre-APA discretion, i.e. the reasonable exercise of
power, uncluttered by the gloss on "by law committed" which is
Professor Davis' later brainchild. He has never claimed that the
words "by law committed" were words of art prior to the APA.
His reading confessedly represents no more than his "practical
solution" of a "difficult problem" of interpretation; 87 the "legislative history," he admits, "does not compel" his interpretation. 88
Therefore, when the Senate committee merely quoted the statutory words "by law committed," it said nothing which advances
the Davis argument that those words curtail the scope of section
10(e). In the absence of any contrary explanation, the presumption must prevail that when Congress employed the terms "discretion" and "abuse of discretion," it adopted the mutually exclusive meanings given those two terms by the courts,8 9 so that
the exception for "discretion" did not affect review of "abuse of
discretion." That presumption is confirmed by the distinction
Chairman Walter carefully drew when, after alluding to the
exception for "discretion," he stated that arbitrariness would be
reviewable "in any case."'90
2. The House Committee said: "Section 10 on judicial review
does not apply in any situation so far as . . . agency action is
by law committed to agency discretion ....
Where laws are
so broadly drawn that agencies have large discretion, the situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure
act ....

91

Again "by law committed" means "by law committed." The reference to "broadly drawn" grants of "large discretion" speaks
to the problems raised by standards so broad- as to leave an
agency virtually at large. As the parallel passage in the Senate
report states, "If, for example, statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law' to apply, courts of
86. Davis, Postscript 827.
87. Id. at 825, 828. See § IV infra.
88.
89.

(1959);
90.
echoed
91.

Davis, Postscript 828.
Cf. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05

DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 381 (1919).
See text accompanying note 75 supra. 'Walter's statement is
by the House report. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
Davis, Postscript 827.
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course have no statutory question to review. ' 92 More precisely,
given an overly broad grant of power, almost any administrative
act will be within its confines and will raise no issue of limits
which courts must apply. Courts cannot cut down "large" grants
of power; but they can police "limits" and they can, by review
of arbitrariness, prevent the oppressive exercise of limited grants.
3. The Senate Judiciary Print said of Section 10: "The introductory exceptions state the two present general or basic situations in which judicial review is precluded-where (1) the
matter is discretionary or (2) statutes withhold judicial powers." The word "present" seems to me [Davis] to indicate an
intent to have previously-existing law continue with respect
to review of discretion,
and this is the interpretation the
courts have given. 93
The "present" law with respect to "discretionary" matters was
that courts would not interfere with the reasonable exercise of
delegated power, but they would set aside "abuse of discretion"
or "arbitrary" action. Professor Davis' citations of pre-APA cases
'for the contrary "interpretation the courts have given" simply
fail to establish insulation of arbitrariness from judicial review,
and it would be supererogatory to attempt a summary of my
extended analysis of those cases. 94 If my analysis be faulty,
the fact remains those cases were not called to the attention of
Congress; and as my quotations from the legislative history make
clear, Congress intended to make abuse of discretion reviewable
without qualification. The word "present" affords a flimsy basis
for Davis' disregard of Chairman Walter's statement, for example, that arbitrariness was to be reviewable "in any case."
4. The Attorney General said that section 10 "in general, declares the existing law concerning judicial review." Mr. McFarland [Chairman of the ABA Special Committee on Adminisratve Law] said: "We do not believe the principle of review
or the extent of review can or should be greatly altered. We
think the basic exception of administrative discretion should
95
be preserved, must be preserved."

92. S. Doc. No. 248, at 212: The quoted passage is followed by:
." hat- situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act
but must be treated by the revision of statutes conferring administratixe power." Id. See also FEEmDLY, THE FDERAL ADM xsTRATrVE AGEN-

cEs: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION Or- STANARs (1962).

93. Davis, Postscript 827.
94. For analysis of the cases, see Berger, Reply 796-804. Professor
Davis never attempts to rebut this analysis, but is content to state that
"after reading [Berger's] argument I find no reason to change any one
of them [Davis' "interpretations"].". Davis, Final Word 814. See also
Davis, Postscript 829. The reader who desires further light on Davis'
,unwilingness to revise a position once taken is referred to my analysis
of his. "interpretations."
95. Davis, Postscript 827.
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The "existing law" was insulation of reasonable exercise of delegated power and review of oppressive abuse of discretion. Were
this less clear, the Attorney General's at best equivocal utterance still is not sufficient to curtail the clear terms of section
10(e), particularly in light of the legislative history which repeatedly shows that arbitrariness was to be reviewable without
qualification. Observe also that Mr. McFarland did not employ
Professor Davis' talismanic "by law committed"; what was to be
preserved was the "basic exception of administrative discretion,"
pure and simple. This from a chief draftsman of the Act who
knew well enough where the bones were buried.
So compelling do his quotations seem to Professor Davis
that he bursts into italics to stress that:
In his Columbia Law Review Article, [Berger] has three pages
under the title "The Legislative History" and those three
pages do not mention any single statement I have quoted from
the legislative history. Is he unwilling to look at the history
that is against hin?96
No, Professor Davis, Berger was not "unwilling to look"; he did
look and for the above reasons concluded that those statements
shed no light on whether the word "committed" was designed to
curtail the section 10(e) directive in favor of selective unreviewability. Since no one faintly intimated in those statements or
elsewhere that any kind of arbitrariness would be unreviewable,
I found it difficult to conceive that the statements. that I cited,
which expressly corroborate the section 10(e) provision that arbitrariness would always be reviewable, could be overcome by
ambiguous expressions that "discretion" was "by law committed"
to agencies or that "discretion" was to be "preserved.!' Of course
discretion was to be preserved, but the question is "was any part
of 'abuse of discretion' to be preserved," and that question is
not answered by assuming, in the teeth of judicial statements to
.the contrary, that "discretion" comprehends "abuse of discretion"
and that therefore arbitrary action was to be "preserved."
Now that Professor Davis has brought forth his legislative
,history, the reader may judge for himself whether my vision
was distorted. In my "Rejoinder" I stated there was "not a shred
of evidence in the legislative history for [the Davis] view that
.arbitrary action was to be selectively unreviewable--all the evidence points the other way. So there is no conflict on this score
in the legislative history."97 "Of all the strange Berger positi96. Ibid.
97. Berger, Rejoinder 817.

-
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tions," says Professor Davis, "this is the strangest."9 s Even more
-"strange," I daresay, is his capacity to balance his few equivocal
citations against the unambiguous legislative utterances which
indicate that arbitrariness, without qualification, was to be reviewable-as Chairman Walter and the House Report stated, "in
any case."
IV.

PROFESSOR DAVIS' "SOLUTION"

Professor Davis' arguments respecting constitutionality, the
statutory terms, and the legislative history have crumbled under
examination. Our constitutional system leaves no room for arbitrariness, and if that is not crystal clear, an equivocal statutory
phrase such as "by law committed" should still be construed to
avoid a constitutional doubt, especially when the Davis "solution" would curtail the express and unqualified section 10(e) directive to set aside "abuse of discretion."
On what does Professor Davis build his theory that the
words "by law committed" authorize selective unreviewability
of arbitrary action? He admits: "I do not say that the statutory
words require my interpretation. Nor do I say that the legislative history-must be interpreted my way."99 Instead, he offers
his theory as "the best solution that I have been able to find for
a difficult problem."'10 0 The difficulty is of his own making,
proceeding from his assumption that "discretion" comprehends
"abuse of discretion" and therefore the exception for "discretion"
necessarily curtails the section 10(e) directive to set "abuse of
discretion" aside. That assumption, as we have seen, flies in the
face of judicial treatment of the two as opposites, a treatment
followed by Congress. It prefers a construction which creates a
"difficulty" to a traditional reading which avoids it.
Having generated a "difficulty," Professor Davis then sought
.a practical interpretation which will carry out the probable
intent." 01' This "probable intent" was speedily transmuted into
10 2
a "clear expression of Congress in favor of preventing review";
this was what Congress "so clearly said."'0 3 Happily, he has
since beat a retreat. Now he does "not say that the statutory
words require [his] interpretation."' 0 4 Since, in addition and by
98.

Davis, Postscript 826.

99. Id. at 825. Contrast this with the cocksure statement he made
earlier. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
100. Ibid.

101.
102.
103.
104.

4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.16, at 80. (Emphasis added.)
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
Ibid.
Davis, Postscript825.
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his own testimony, the "legislative history [in his view is] conflicting and unhelpful," and since he does "not base [his] position
upon the legislative history,"'1 5 where does Professor Davis derive a "probable intent" to curtail the express section 10(e) mandate to set aside "abuse of discretion"? Certainly not from the
face of the statute, which brands "abuse of discretion" as "not
warranted by law" and therefore excludes it from "action by law
committed to agency discretion."
Yet "by law committed" is the key building block in the
Davis "solution":
The main idea is to emphasize the word "committed." So far
as the action is by law "committed" to agency discretion, it is
not reviewable, even for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion; it
is not "committed" to agency discretion to the extent that it is
reviewable. This means that the two concepts "committed to
agency discretion" and "unreviewable" have in this limited
context the same meaning. Both depend upon the statutes
and the common law. To the extent that "the law" cuts off
review for abuse of discretion, the action is committed to
agency discretion. The result is that the pre-act law on this
point continues.' 0 6
This "solution" is admittedly not "required" by the "statutory
words"; neither is it required by the legislative history. Professor Davis is now content to state that "taken as a whole" the
10 7
legislative history "is not inconsistent with [his] solution."'
But this is a very flimsy basis upon which to cut down the express terms of section 10(e). Moreover, exemptions from the
APA-here from the express directive of section 10(e)-are "not
lightly to be presumed."'0 8 Against his "solution" also runs the
conflict between "by law committed" and the section 10(e) declaration that arbitrariness is "not warranted by law," as well as
Chairman McCarran's common sense explanation that "by law
committed" simply means "intentionally given."' 0 9 Professor
Davis' strained "solution" must also be weighed against his own
"opposition to administrative arbitrariness and abuse of discretion,"1 0 his ostensibly "passionate belief" in the Supreme Court's
"remark that 'there is no place in our constitutional system for
105. Id. at 825, 828.
106. Id. at 825. See § VII infra for my critique of Davis' interpretation of pre-APA case law on this point. See also note 114 infra and
accompanying text.
107. Davis, Postscript 828.
108. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956).
109. See text accompanying note 83 supra. The Chairman inferred
that "by law committed" was without impact on § 10(e), for he went
on to say that "abuse of discretion" is expressly made reviewable.
110. Davis, Comment 17.
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the exercise of arbitrary power.' "111 He would do well to ponder
the statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a mighty paladin of the
administrative process: "[H] e is no friend of administrative law
who thinks that the Commission should be left at large, 11 2 and,
of all things, to act oppressively and unreasonably with impunity.
V.

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND
EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION 10

The Davis "solution" "depend [s] upon statutes and the common law.""13 He cites no case which does not turn on an explicit
or tacit interpretation of the statutory grant of discretion, and
his assertion that there is a "common law" of nonreviewable arbitrariness is really undocumented." 4 If a statute bars review,
the matter is covered by the first exception to section 10, "where
statutes preclude review"; and if a judicial construction of such a
statute bars review, this is "inexplicit" preclusion, which is also
covered by the first exception. Thus a special construction of
the second exception in order to preserve statutes which (allegedly) preclude review of arbitrariness is superfluous. 1 5
To this Professor Davis retorts that Berger
apparently does not realize that whenever a statute precludes
review of discretion, agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion. That a statute precludes review does not
mean that the discretion exception is inapplicable, for the two
parts of the introductory clause overlap. 116
111. Davis, Final Word 815.
112. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 406
(1952) (dissenting opinion).
113. See quote in text accompanying note 106 supra.
114. The Davis citations are to cases that construed statutes and
mistakenly concluded, in a few instances, that the mere grant of discretion cuts off review of arbitrariness. See Davis, Comment 18-23. For
analysis of his citations, see Berger, RepZy 796-804. Apparently he regards United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964),
as an example of the "common law of unreviewability." See Davis,
Comment 26-27. But that case also turned on a "discretion" statutethe Secretary of the Treasury, the statute provided, "may" act. In the
forfeiture field there involved, the courts construed the statutory discretion against a background of holdings that remissions of forfeitures
were an "act of grace." If there is a "common law" of unreviewable
arbitrariness-a highly debatable "if"---not one such case was called to
the attention of Congress. No one made a plea for insulation of arbitrariness from review in reliance on any decision; and there is not the
faintest suggestion in the legislative history that the "committed" phrase
was meant to be a vehicle of such insulation.
115. See Berger, Reply 811-12. An interpretation that Congress ex.pressed itself tautologically is to "be avoided if fairly possible." Emery
Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F.2d 166, 172 (8th Cir. 1938).
116. Davis, Postscript830. Apart from the second exception of § 10
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His assumption that the two exceptions "overlap" raises the
question: Why did Congress resort to "overlap"? Not, certainly,
because it feared that a statute which explicitly or inexplicitly
precluded review of abuse of discretion would not be caught up
in the first exception. No one suggested that the second exception was needed if the first exception for statutory preclusion
failed to shelter arbitrariness. Rather, by the second exception
Congress wanted to make sure that the reasonable exercise of
delegated power would be left untouched-that, in Mr. McFarland's words, the "basic exception for administrative discretion
should be preserved.""n7 Others had expressed this same concern; 118 and the second exception, I suggest, should be regarded
as a precaution for that special purpose, not as an "overlap" to
backstop inadequate coverage by the first exception of statutes
which (allegedly) shield arbitrariness from review. This approach is indeed compelled by the need to avoid a dual set of
standards for statutory unreviewability, which the "overlap"
would inexplicably engender, as will hereafter appear." 9
VI. THE "FREEZING" PROBLEM CREATED BY THE
DAVIS ANALYSIS
Commenting on a particular agency statute, Professor Davis
stated that "the whole question of complete unreviewability...
might well be re-examined;' ' 20 I pointed out that under his analysis the pre-APA interpretation of such statutes was frozen by
the introductory exceptions in section 10 of the APA, and that
he had painted himself into a corner.12 ' To my showing that he
has deprived the courts of the power to reconsider their prior
preclusive interpretations of primary statutes, he retorts:
which expressly precludes review of discretion, I recall but one statute
which explicitly provides that the "discretion" which it confers shall be,
unreviewable. See Berger, Article 61. A few courts have concluded that
because of the second exception to § 10 of the APA, the "discretion"
conferred by other statutes is unreviewable. To speak of a statute
which precludes review of "abuse of discretion" is therefore to assume
the answer to the question at issue: was the mere grant of "discretion"
meant to bar review of abuse of discretion.
117. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
118. As the House report stated: '"atters of discretion are necessarily excepted from the section, since otherwise courts would in effect
supersede agency functioning." S. Doc. No. 248, at 275. See also id. at
36. In other words the normal, reasonable exercise of delegated power
by an agency was to be left alone. This was what "discretion" meant
to Congress and to the courts.
119. See § VIII infra.
120. Davis, Comment 28.
121. Berger, Reply 810.
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Of course, if my analysis had any such effect, I would reject it.
But the act did not freeze any prior practice. The act can
still leave the courts free to go on
codify pre-existing law and 122
developing the codified law.
"More careful" reading, he states, would have led me to his
statement that the "courts remain free, except to the extent that
other statutes are controlling, to continue to determine on practical grounds in particular cases to what extent action should or
should not be unreviewable even for abuse of discretion."' 23 But
this statement is utterly irreconcilable with the sum of his
other statements; he cannot have his cake and eat it too. Since

my "misunderstanding" on this score is allegedly "unsound on 24a
subtle basis and reaches the heart of [his] . . . interpretation,"'
it merits close consideration, the more so because if my demonstration is solidly based, Davis proclaims that he himself "would

reject" his analysis.
According to Professor Davis:
"committed to agency discretion" and "unreviewable" have
To the extent that "the law" cuts
. . the same meaning ....
off review for abuse of discretion, the action is committed to
agency discretion.
125 The result is that the pre-act law on this
point continues.
The "discretion" exception, he stated, represented a "clear expression of Congress in favor of preventing review."'2 6 If the
existing "law" (primary statute) "cuts off review," if "the preAct law on this point continues," and if "committed to agency
*

discretion" means "unreviewable" and was designed to "prevent"
review, all this adds up to the incorporation in section 10 of the
"pre-Act law" of unreviewability, which courts were given no
power to change. This is incontrovertibly true with respect to a
primary statute which expressly precludes review, for such a
statute cannot be altered by the courts and it is plainly preserved by the first exception, "where statutes preclude review."
So too, if such a statute had been judicially construed to prevent
review, this inexplicit preclusion of review was likewise "continued" on the Davis analysis and cannot be changed by the courts.
27
Such has been the judicial construction of the first exception.
122. Davis, Postscript 825 n.13.
123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.
125. Davis, Postscript 825. By "pre-Act law" and the "law," Professor Davis means primary agency statutes which explicitly or inexplicitly preclude review. His inclusion of the "common law" was discussed in the text accompanying note 114 supra.
126. Davis, Comment 25. (Emphasis added.)
127. It was said with respect to the first exception that "when, as
in the Switchmen's case, it had been held that Congress had manifested
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And despite the Davis "overlap" argument, we have no congressional indication that the "statutes" which govern "abuse of discretion" and their pre-Act interpretations were to be treated altogether differently, i.e., that the courts were powerless to alter
inexplicit statutory preclusion under the first exception but had
unlimited control over such statutory interpretations under the
second exception. I submit that under the Davis analysis any
"pre-Act" statutory preclusion of review, explicit or inexplicit,
was the "law" embodied in the phrase "by law committed," that
such "law" was to "continue," and that it was therefore placed
beyond the power of judicial revision. And if there is no preclusionary statute that bars review, there is no independent judicial power to bar review of arbitrariness. By his own test,
Professor Davis would therefore be well advised to "reject" his
analysis.
VII. "THE CASES"
Throughout, Professor Davis has played a tattoo on "the
cases," and though I analyzed his citations painstakingly he professes to be mystified about what my "main position about the
129
case law is.1'128 My analysis was not wrapped in mystery:
1) His pre-APA cases and his two post-APA Supreme Court
citations completely fail to sustain his claim that the grant of discretion barred review of arbitrariness; 2) Of the handful of
cases which cite the Davis "solution," very few squarely hold
that arbitrariness is unreviewable; the rest utter pure dicta as a
prelude to review of arbitrariness. No case which cites his
"solution" has attempted to compare it with the statutory terms,
legislative history, and constitutional considerations-the courts
have taken him on faith. Since I believe that Professor Davis is
demonstrably "wrong," and since the cases which cite his "solution" uncritically can rise no higher than their source, I must
perforce conclude that these citations are equally "wrong."' 30
Multiplication of such uncritical citations merely seeks to repel
analysis with a nose-count.' 3 ' Error does not become sanctified
its intention to exclude review the new [APA] legislation was not to
be construed as changing the situation." Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v.
National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1951). A fortiori,
no court could do so. Switchmen's, said Professor Davis, is a case of
inexplicit preclusion. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
128. Davis, Postscript 830.
129. For analysis of the Davis citations, see Berger, Reply 796-804.
130. See Davis, Postscript 830.
131. Davis maintains that such citations, which rely on a theory
about which he has grown quite modest, represent "the law as it is,"
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by repetition, even in the highest quarters.
The latest "case" which Professor Davis adds to his nosecount, Vucinic v. United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv.,13 2 serves only further to sap confidence in his judgment.
Vucinic, he asserts, "adopts my analysis.' 133 Some "adoption"!
Noting the difficulty Davis experiences in juxtaposing the "discretion" exception and the section 10(e) mandate to set aside
"abuse of discretion," the court stated: "To solve the verbal puzzle, Davis suggests that the word 'committed' be employed ......
The court then quoted the Davis explanation and went on to
say:
It is certain that the granting or withholding of an alien crewman's parole into the United States under the Attorney General's regulation ...

lies within the District Director's "discre-

tion" in the sense that he is responsible for receiving and
weighing the relevant evidence and that the courts win not
substitute judgment. However, I am unable to conclude that
the decision relating to parole is "committed to .

.

. discretion"

in the sense, to apply Davis's analysis, of making his findings,
conclusions and order unreviewable-even for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of discretion. Moreover, courts have
often refused to recognize even a fairly explicit denial of reviewability when the
8 4 issues of arbitrariness or abuse of discretion are raised.1
Actually the court in Vucinic found no magical compulsion in
the "committed" phrase and was "unable to conclude" that the
mere grant of "discretion" prevented review of "abuse of discretion." The reason appears on the face of the opinion: the court
never mind the powerful argument based on the face of the statute, the
legislative history, and the constitutional doctrine denying arbitrariness
any place in our system. When he says "our debate is about what the
law is, not what it ought to be," Davis, Postscript 823, he speaks for
himself. Properly construed, the statute, not Davis' few mistaken judicial followers, represents what the law is. If I am utterly unable to
comprehend what the law "is," I am yet persuaded that arbitrariness is
so alien to our institutions that the law "ought to be" that there is no
place for arbitrariness, precisely as the Supreme Court has stated. See
text accompanying notes 10 and 15 supra.
Professor Davis states that "Berger's principal claim of support in
the case law is a dictum in a district court case that has now been
decided by the Fourth Circuit [on other grounds]. The dictum does
not seem to support [Berger]. . .

."

Davis, Postscript 829.

The reader

will find that Davis' discussion of these decisions sheds revealing light
on his way with a case. See Berger, Rejoinder 817-19. But I leave
nose-counts to Professor Davis. If my analysis is sound, it calls for
judicial rejection of the Davis "solution." If Davis' analysis is unsound,
it is not improved by uncritical judicial citation.
132. 243 F, Supp. 113 (D. Ore. 1965).
133. Davis, Postscript 828 n.27.
134. 243 F. Supp. at 116.
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declined to assign greater weight to the equivocal "committed"
than to "a fairly explicit denial of reviewability" which, the opinion noted, courts have "refused to recognize" as a bar to review
of arbitrariness. 135 Far from being an "adoption" of Davis' "solution," Vucinic constitutes a tacit rejection. His earlier citations
stand no better, as the reader may confirm by resort to my
previous analysis. 136
In evaluating uncritical citations of the Davis "solution," it
is to be noted that the claims he earlier made for his "solution"
have shrunken very considerably. He now disclaims the proposition that his "solution" is required by the statutory words or
the legislative history; he claims no more than "it is the best
solution that I have been able to find for a difficult problem."
And he continues with the deplorable statement: "Rightly or
wrongly, this solution has been adopted by every court that has
considered it .... -137 If "wrongly," the citations add up to absolutely nothing. And the astonishing implication of "wrongly"
is that it matters not whether Davis' "solution" is "right" so
long as it is cited! The overtones of "rightly or wrongly" are
amplified by his continued reliance on the "Cadillac and Pullman
cases," which are "against" me. 13 8 Those cases, as I stated "do
not rely on Professor Davis but conclude that the discretion exception cuts off review of abuse of discretion on the ground that
'we have no right to disregard this plain language.' "139 In
short, they rest on a "literal" reading of the "except" clause.
To be sure, "the law of the[se] cases is against" me, but it does
Professor Davis little credit to rely upon them. For, as I also
pointed out, "the 'literal language' of the second exception, read
against section 10(e), as Professor Davis said, 'makes neither
grammatical sense nor practical sense, for the exception consumes
135. See text accompanying note 134 supra. Assuming the Davis
"solution," why was the court "unable to conclude" that the grant of
discretion was "by law committed" so as to make arbitrariness unreviewable? Professor Davis does not tell us. I have called upon him to
furnish criteria whereby courts (in the absence of alleged "pre-Act
law") may determine when a grant of discretion is "by law committed"
so as to foreclose review. See Berger, Rejoinder 819. See also Berger,
Reply 799-803 (discussion of the maze into which his "solution" led one
court). But he has been laggard. The courts that cite his "solution"
come to diametrically opposed results, with Davis conferring his blessing on "both your houses." See Berger, Rejoinder 819-21.
136. Berger, Reply 796-804.
137. Davis, Postscript 825. (Emphasis added.)
138. Id. at 829. The cases are United States v. One 1961 Cadillac,
337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964), and Pullman Trust & Say. Bank v. United
States, 225 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. II. 1964).
139. Berger, Repli 803.
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he still adheres; 141 and it is on this discredited "literal" reading
that Pullman and Cadillac rest. Professor Davis is therefore
flailing me with cases which invoke an analysis that he himself
repudiates.
VIII. IDENTIFICATION OF THE CRITERIA FOR "BY LAW
COMMITTED"
Suppose that I am mistaken in my view that the face of the
statute, the legislative history, and the Constitution bar the Davis
"solution." Suppose that section 10 does in fact make selective
arbitrariness unreviewable. How are the courts then to determine whether a particular function is "by law committed" so as
to foreclose judicial review? One court which, unlike the Vucinic
court, attempted to apply the Davis "solution," became involved
in a maze.'
Professor Davis recognizes that when a statute explicitly or
inexplicitly makes abuse of discretion unreviewable, the situation
is covered by the first exception--"where statutes preclude judicial review." But his plea in avoidance is that the first and
second exceptions "overlap.'. 4 3 Be it so. Indubitably the test of
nonreviewability under the first exception is that stated in the
House report: "To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face
give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it."'4 4
140. Davis, Comment 21.
141. Davis, Postscript 824.
142. In Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 904 (1965), the court held that action is "committed by law to
agency discretion" when the statute is "permissive," i.e., when it permits rather than commands an administrator to act. Despite Professor
Davis' acclaim of the case as "well-considered," he finds it possible to
approve of cases that are at odds with it. See Berger, Reply 799-803,
808-09; Berger, Rejoinder 820. Furthermore, the "permissive" formula
of Ferry v. Udall runs counter to the recent decision in Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966). There the statute alsb
provided that "the Board ... may direct the payment," and the Court
noted that "this contemplates that the Commission shall have a certain
amount of discretion. . . ." After considering certain facts, the Court
concluded that "this by itself might not be sufficient to establish that
the Commission abused its discretion under the Act." Id. at 621-22.
Thus the fact that a statute is "permissive" does not, Ferry v. Udall to
the contrary notwithstanding, shut off review of abuse of discretion.
143. Davis, Postscript 830. See § V supra.
144. S. Doc. No. 248, at 275. (Emphasis added.)
In his sharply critical review of Professor Jaffe's book, Davis states:
Jaffe says that a post-APA statute must "explicitly" preclude
review "to rebut the presumption of the APA in favor of re-
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view." *My opinion is that a discernible intent of Congress is
enough whether or not it is explicitly expressed. And I know
of no "presumption of the APA in favor of review." The APA
codifies the previous law, including whatever presumption the
previous law contained, but the APA does not otherwise erect
any presumption in favor Qf review.
Davis on Jaffe, 651. These statements are themselves impeachable.
1) Davis' "The APA codifies the previous law" is contradicted by the
Senate report statement that the proposed bill was not "a codification
of administrative law." S. Doc. No. 248, at 193. 2) The House report
did not require merely a "discernible intent" to bar review, which
might perhaps be satisfied by legislative history of a given statute.
Instead, it demanded that the given statute "must upon its face give
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it," a far different and more stringent requirement. 3) A "presumption" is simply an
inference from known facts. The relevant facts, m the words of Chairman Walter, are that
Legislative intent to forbid judicial review must be, if not specific and in terms, at least clear, convincing, and unmistakable
under this bill. The mere fact that Congress has not [by a
given statute] expressly provided for judicial review would be
completely immaterial..
Id. at 368. Plainly, Congress assumed that judicial review would be
the rule, and expressly stated that statutory nonreviewability is the
"rare" exception ("Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review").
Id. at 212, 275, 368. Though Congress did not employ the word presumption, what it said is fairly translatable into a presumption that
judicial review would be available in the absence of an unmistakable
congressional intent to preclude it, a presumption that is reinforced by
Fongressional statements that "Judicial review is of utmost importance
It is indispensable .... " Id. at 217, 281. As Chairman McCarran
ekpldined to the bar shortly after enactment of the APA,
it is therefore a major premise of the statute that judicial review is not merely available but is plenary in every proper
sense of the word. .
[N]o citizen need complain that he is
without it if he has-been subjected to injury beyond the law.
McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice" Hearings & Evidence;
Scope Qf Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827, 893 (1946)
Professor Davfs' captious rejection of the Jaffe "presumption" is the
more, mystifying because on the preceding page he stated that "The
decisions -of the past -two or three. decades fit reasonably well the idea
of a presumption of reviewability that maybe rebutted by affirmative
indication of legislative intent- m favor of unreviewability
. " Davis
on Jaffe, 650. It is quite reasonable to infer from the several congressional statements earlier quoted that the "idea" was shared by Congress.
And if, in fact, the "opinions have not expressly formulated the presumption," ibid., Davis has been ready enough to overlook such a fact
in twitting Jaffe on another and related score. Id. at 649.
- Professor- Davis himself notices, 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.08, at 35,
that in Heikkila v. Barker; 345 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1953), the Court relied
on the Walter and "very rarely" statements. True, he states that it "runs
counter to deeply embedded traditions concerning statutory interpretation," but.it is open to Congress to lay down how its statutes shall be
construed. It is likewise true that in Switchmens' Union v. National
-Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 279 (1943), the Court found statutory "inexplicit
preclusion" when that was-not clearly apparent "upon its face," but. that
case.antedates the APA and the House committee statement.
As I earlier suggested, the Switchmens' concept- of "inexplicit
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The test for nonreviewability under the second exception, proposed by Professor Davis, is whether the function is "intrinsically unsuited" to judicial review. 145 On what ground are we
to conclude that Congress employed two disparate standards for
statutes which preclude review; a rigorous "on its face" standard
for statutes under the first exception, and the equivocal Davis
test, "intrinsically unsuited" for review, with respect to statutes
which fall under both the first and second exceptions? No indication that Congress had such a result in mind can be found in
the legislative history. It cannot be that Congress was especially
anxious to insulate "abuse of discretion" statutes, for Professor
Davis states that "of course, everyone, including every court,
shares Mr. Berger's opposition to administrative arbitrariness and
abuse of discretion. ' 1 46 Nor is there need to warp or discard the

"on its face" test of the first exception in order to preserve
sound discretion from review, for that is plainly exempted by
the second exception.147

The "overlap" which Professor Davis

conjures up in order to lift statutory unreviewability of abuse of
discretion out of the coverage of the first exception is untenable,
if only because it would avoid the test for statutory preclusion
expressly supplied by the House report, and substitute an "intrinsically unsuited for review" test of which not an inkling is to
be found in the legislative history. If the House report furnishes
the test of statutory unreviewability, as seems undeniable, all of
Professor Davis' discussion about "intrinsically unsuited" for re148
view and "practical needs" is beside the point.
So far as the "intrinsically unsuited" criterion is relevant, 149
Professor Davis has approved two pairs of cases, and in each of
those pairs, the cases arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions
in terms of that criterion, so that he has laid himself open to
the charge that he is working both sides of the street. 150 In no
preclusion" needs to be reexamined in light of this Committee report.
Berger, Reply 812 n.159.
145. Davis, Comment 25.
146. Id. at 17.
147. Berger, Reply 790.
148. Davis, Postscript 831-32; Davis, Comment 25.
149. Professor Davis does not explain his "intrinsically unsuited to
judicial review" beyond citing some exmnples which he thinks selfevidently exclude review, such as the presidential power in foreign
affairs. Davis, Comment 25. See Berger, Article 79-80.
150. The cases and Professor Davis' condemnation of the Supreme
Court for issuing opinions which looked "both ways" are discussed in
Berger, Reply 819-21. See also Davis on Jaffe, 657. Compare Davis'
statement, "The two proposals differ substantially. Jaffe's agreement
with both implies lack of concern for working out the legislative reform." Id. at 645 n.50.
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corner of American life can it be assumed that an official function is "intrinsically unsuited" for judicial protection against oppression. Professor Davis now professes to "share Mr. Berger's
passionate belief in a Supreme Court remark that 'there is no
place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary
power.' "151 But he has yet to square that "passionate belief"
with his insistence that such protection must be withheld on
hypothetical grounds.
The House report requirement, that "clear and convincing
evidence of intent to withhold" review must appear on the "face"
of the statute, is but a sharpened version of the general rule
articulated by Professor Jaffe as "basic": "[J] udicial review is the
rule.... [T] he intention to exclude it must be made specifically
manifest.' ' 52 Stated differently, there is a "presumption of reviewability." In an opinion that has markedly clarified analysis,
Judge Friendly recently stated for the Second Circuit that, with
respect to a
truly arbitrary administrative decision .... absent any evidence to the contrary, Congress may rather [than "close the

door"]be presumed to have intended that the courts should

fulfill their traditional role of defining and maintaining the

proper bounds of administrative
discretion and safeguarding
3
the rights of the individual.15

Thus the "presumption of reviewability" can only be rebutted
by "evidence" of a congressional intent "to the contrary."
In his "Postscript," Professor Davis "is pleased with" my
statement that "there is a presumption that arbitrariness is re151. Davis, Final Word 815. The Supreme Court's "remark" is confirmed by five other "remarks." See text accompanying notes 9-14
supra, and The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). These
"remarks" are uncontradicted by any other "remarks."

152. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401, 432

(1958). See also The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903):
An act of Congress must be taken to be constitutional unless
the contrary plainly and palpably appears. The words here
used do not require an interpretation that would invest executive or administrative officers with the absolute, arbitrary
power ....

In other words, not only is there a presumption of reviewability, but
any indication that Congress intended to vest officials with "arbitrary
power" would render the Act unconstitutional. Both the Senate report
and the House report on the APA emphasized that
very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never
been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its
own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of
authority granted or to the objectives specified.
S. Doc. No. 248, at 212, 275.
153. Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1966). (Emphasis added.) In a subsequent opinion, Judge Friendly stated that
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viewable unless there is 'evidence to the contrary.'
he says, "is my position, too, and has been ...

15 4

"This,"
since ... 1954."

"But," he continues:
Mr. Berger asserts that the idea of a presumption of reviewability "is vastly to be preferred to Davis' 'intrinsically unsuited' standard ...." He misunderstands when he goes on
to say: "Professor Davis puts the shoe on the other foot: 'nothing but the clearest and strongest congressional intent could
induce the court to undertake tasks which the judges deem
inappropriate for judicial action....' He fails to note that
the statement is limited to "tiskswhich the judges deem inappropriatefor judicial action."1 55

It is Professor Davis who completely misses the point. Whether
judges "deem" review of arbitrariness "inappropriate" in a particular case is of no moment if there is a "presumption of reviewability" which, as Judge Friendly properly declared, can only be
overcome by "evidence" of a congressional intent to "close the
door" to review. If there is no such evidence, there is no room
for judicial consideration of whether review is "appropriate," for
the presumption prevails. By the same token, the Davis appeal
to functions "intrinsically unsuited" to review must yield to the

"presumption," in the absence of "evidence" that Congress intended the presumption to be inoperative. And I would reemphasize that the test for such "evidence"--"overlap" or notis whether the "face" of the statute gives-"clear and convincing"
indication of congressional intent to preclude review.
IX. "THE PRACTICL NEEDS"
Professor Davis lays down a veritable barrage of hypothetical cases which he considers self-evidently reveal the absurdity
of across-the-board reviewability of administrative arbitrariness. 156 Practical needs are irrelevant if there is a "presumption

of reviewability" which only a plainly expressed congressional
intention to shut off review can overcome. Even, so, it may be
that experience will .lead the courts, under the stress of par"only in the rare-some say non-existent--case where discretion ['is not
subject to the restraint of the obligation of reasoned decision'] may rev¢iew,'for 'abuse' be precluded." Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1966).
154. Davis, Postscript 830 n.35.
155. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
156. Id. at 831-32. As Mr. Justice Miller stated:
Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particularly fruitful imagination in regard to almost every law upon
which depend the rights of the individual or of the government,
and if the existence of laws is to depend, on their capacity to
withstand such criticism, the whole fabric 6f the lair must fail.
United States v., Lee,' 10 U.S. -196, 217 "(1882)-.
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ticular facts, to read a limitation into the broad terms of section
10(e) despite the fact that the legislative history bespeaks an
unqualified intention to reach abuse of discretion "in any case."
That hypothetical possibility, however, scarcely requires courts
to engraft a priori limitations upon a remedial statute instead of
waiting for demands that arise from a developed record. 5 7 Such
exclusions, which alter or rewrite statutory terms, should rest on
demonstrable needs, not on assumptions rooted in generalities.
In my "Article" I demonstrated the untenability of several
earlier Davis examples, 158 but he has studiously avoided comment thereon and instead has marshalled a fresh array. Thus,
he earlier asked: "Should the courts inquire whether a commanding officer of a domestic military post has abused his discretion in denying a requested leave?"' 5 9 This is not to be
laughed out of court. 1) The APA inclusion of the military,
with certain not relevant exceptions, repels a carte blanche for
military oppression. 60 2) Patently, leave could not be denied on
the ground that a soldier was a Negro or Jew, 61 or a redhead or
Mason. 6 2 3) The Swedish Military Ombudsman was created
"to guard citizens against abuses in military administration," and
albeit the examples cited by Professor Gellhorn of prosecutions
by the Ombudsman for such abuses 63 might not run the gauntlet of Professor Davis' a priori assumptions, they give color of
"practicality" to judicial review, even of petty tyranny. What
157. "We should be careful not wholly to give up all potential jurisdiction on abstract grounds lest we make wise handling of future cases
difficult or impossible." Louisell, Responding to the December 8th Resolution: Of Politics, Free Speech, and Due Process, 54 CALI. L. REv. 107,
116 (1966).
158. Berger, Article 78-80.

159. 4 DAvis,

TREATiSE

§ 28.16, at 82.

160. Berger, Article 80. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378,
401 (1932), "What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and
whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are

judicial questions."

161. It was precisely on such grounds that Professor Davis criticized
the opinion in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). See
note 19 supra.
162. Berger, Article 82-83; Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1961); cf. Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 89, 123 (1849) "The humblest seaman or marine is to be sheltered under the aegis of the law from any real wrong ......
163. Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1, 38
(1965); Gellhorn, Finland's Official Watchmen, 114 U. PA. L. Rzv. 327,
343 (1966) (among complaints filed were six by "conscripts who objected to treatment by their military superiors"); cf. Gellhorn, The Ombudsman in Denmark, 12 McGixi L.J. 1, 3 (1966). See also Berger, Reply
807 n.135.
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can be better calculated to encourage oppression than the assurance that the oppressor is immune from judicial review; what
better way to deter official abuse than the threat of accountability? As the Senate report, the House report, and Chairman
McCarran stated, judicial review is "indispensable since its mere
existence generally precludes the arbitrary exercise of powers
"164

Since Professor Davis has made no attempt to meet my dissection of several of his examples, it is unfruitful to undertake
the inspection of still other examples.' 6 5 If they have more
merit than appears on the surface, they yet suffer from a serious
defect: they would deny review of oppression on a priori assumptions that selected functions are "intrinsically unsuited" to
review. The Founding Fathers held strong views against arbitrariness, professedly shared by Professor Davis. 16 In the words
of James Wilson, "Every wanton, or causeless, or unnecessary act
of authority ... is wrong, and unjustifiable, and tyrannical
.... 162 It is a betrayal of their ideals to withhold constitutional protection against arbitrariness, and on hypothetical
grounds at that.
X. DISTORTIONS, MISREPRESENTATIONS, AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS
It needs no argument that a scholar who persistently distorts and misrepresents the position of his critic, and who resorts to misleading statements to score points, impeaches his
own integrity and shakes the confidence of those who rely upon
him. For example, in my "Rejoinder" I pointed out how Professor Davis twisted my remark that the heavily burdened
"courts increasingly look to [scholars] for guidance" into my al164. S. Doc. No. 248, at 217, 281, 326. See also Berger, Article 93
n.207.
165. Mr. Justice Jackson said of a row of citations that "if the first
decision cited does not support it [the proposition], I conclude the lawyer
has a blunderbuss mind and rely on him no further." Jackson, Advocacy
Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations,
37 A.B.A.J. 801, 804 (1951).
166. Davis, Final Word 815.
167. 2 WiLsoN's WoRKs 393 (Andrews ed. 1896). Reporting to Maryland after the Federal Convention, Luther Martin said: "By the principles of the American revolution, arbitrarypower may and ought to be
resisted .... ." 3 FAmRaaw, REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION 223
(1911). And Congressman Jackson said in the First Congress that
"every act of authority of one man over another for which there is not
an absolute necessity is tyrannical." 1 AzmuiNs OF CONG. 830 (1789)
[1789-1824].

1967]

SEQUEL

legedly "naive notion that judges obey when the treatise writer
16 8
Though he exhibited a
commands"-obviously unfair ridicule.
6 9
he offers not a
tender conscience in flagellating Dean Pound,
word of extenuation in his "Postscript," but plunges deeper into
the mire.
1) "When Professor Jaffe says that 'there are statutory discretions which are not subject to judicial review,'" states Pro' 70
fessor Davis, "he takes a position directly opposed to Berger's.'
Now Davis must have realized that this was contrary to fact.
My position is that the second exception of section 10 does not
curtail the section 10(e) directive to set aside "abuse of discretion." This is exactly Professor Jaffe's view:
The further provisions of the judicial-review section [section
10] make it clear that the mere presence of agency discretion
does not oust review. Under the heading [in section 10 (e)]
"Scope of Review" an agency action may be set aside for an
implies reviewability de"abuse of discretion," which clearly
7
spite the presence of discretion.' '

Indeed, at the very time that Davis was invoking Jaffe
against me in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review he
was criticizing him sharply in the Columbia Law Review for
espousing a view that is identical with mine:
In discussing the APA, Professor Jaffe italicizes the statement:
"the presence of discretion should not bar a court from considering a claim of illegal or arbitrary use of discretion." I
think the statement is unsound ....

The presence of dis-

cretion often bars a court from considering arbitrary use of
discretion .... 172
Davis' citation of Jaffe as "directly opposed to Berger's" position
168. My remark was but a paraphrase of Cardozo's early statement:
"Crowded dockets make it impossible for judges, however able, to probe
every case to its foundations ....

More and more we are looking to the

scholar in his study, to the jurist rather than to the judge or lawyer,
for inspiration and for guidance." CARwozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
5, 11 (1924).
169. Berger, Reply 793.
170. Davis, Postscript828 n.28. (Emphasis added.) Those who may
condone Davis' reliance on a possibly "equivocal" statement should note
Davis' mordant rebuke to Pound: "The quotation is accurate, but taking
it out of its context and putting it into Pound's context is as clearly
misleading as if the words themselves were false." Davis, Dean Pound
and Administrative Law, 42 COLuTm. L. REv. 89, 97 (1942).

171.

JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMnNISTRATE AcTION

374 (1965).

172. Davis on Jaffe 652. The italicized statement to which Professor
Davis refers is taken from Jaffe's disclaimer of a plea "for judicial interference with discretion; the argument is rather that the presence of discretion should not bar a court from considering a claim of illegal or
arbitraryuse of discretion." JAFFA, op. cit. supra note 171, at 375. Note
that Jaffe's statement about § 10, quoted in the text accompanying note
171 supra, is on the page preceding this statement.
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is therefore not merely dead wrong; it betrays an incapacity to
appreciate that a scholar may not play both ends against the
middle.
2) Professor Davis recklessly charges me with falsity. He
states that "Mr. Berger says falsely that I cited [Community
Nat'l Bank v. Gidney 7 3 ] 'with approval'."' 7 4 In that case, in rereliance on the Davis Treatise, the court held unreviewable a
complaint that the Comptroller of the Currency had abused his
discretion in authorizing a Detroit bank to establish a branch.
The court employed the Davis formula: because agency action
was "by law committed to the discretion of the Comptroller,
such action is not reviewable-even for arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion.' 7 5 Since the court in Gidney specifically invoked
the Davis "solution," since it additionally quoted and relied upon
his judgment that the banking function "is largely immune
from the checks of judicial review" and that "freedom from arbitrary or unfair administrative action must depend upon factors
other than formal procedures or judicial review,"' 76 and since
Gidney was then cited in the Davis Supplement as relying on
the Treatise,7 7 it was not unreasonable to conclude that the case
had his approval. To charge me with "falsity" in these circumstances illustrates his recklessness.
His accompanying explanation is equally dispiriting. The
Gidney issue turns on the fact that the court, in Professor
Davis' words, later "backtracked," and Gidney was then dropped
from his Supplement without a word that the court had recanted and decided that the particular banking function was reviewable for arbitrariness, 7 8 thus running counter to his citation
of Gidney under the head of "Unreviewable [discretionary] Action." Davis explains:
The court first held that approval by the Comptroller of the
Currency of establishment of a branch bank was not reviewable and later changed its mind. Granting and denying licenses has traditionally been reviewable, and therefore the
holding that it was not seemed worthy of mention in the 1963
Supplement to my Treatise. It seemed wrong but unimportant
and I cited it with no word of approval or disapproval. Mr.
173. 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. lich. 1961).
174. Davis, Postscript 829 n.30.
175. 192 F. Supp. at 517, quoted in Berger, Article 76.
176. 192 F. Supp. at 518, quoted in Berger, Rejoinder 819.
177. 4 DAvis, TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1963).
178. See Berger, Article 75 n.109. Only after I had nudged him with
these facts, and with the fact that Gidney conflicted with another case
with which he belabored me, did Professor Davis at last notice that after
Gidney "the court backtracked." Davis, Postscript 829 n.30.
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Berger says falsely that I cited it "with approval."1 79
Let us put to one side his graceless dismissal as "wrong" of a
decision which was framed in reliance on the "solution" he proposed in his Treatise, which was buttressed by citation of his
analysis of the "practical needs" of the banking business, and
which Davis then cited in turn as relying on the Treatise. If the
case "seemed wrong," his citation of it and his belated explanation reveal surprising disregard of his duty to the courts. Gidney
was cited under the head of "Unreviewable Action." It was unaccompanied by a "but see." The court relied on Davis' statements for its holding that an "abuse of discretion" in the banking
field was unreviewable. An author's citation of a case which
quotes his views is unlikely to suggest that he considers the case
to be "wrong." Consequently, a court which turned from the
Davis citation of Gidney to the case itself would have no inkling
that Davis thought it "wrong," but instead would perforce be led
to conclude, like myself, that the "wrong" Gidney case had his
approval and would thereby be likely to perpetuate the "error."
The mildest thing that can be said about this episode is that
Professor Davis little recked whether the courts which relied
upon him would be misled.
A word should also be added about his ineffable dismissal of
both Gidney and my discussion of his handling of the case on the
grounds that "granting and denying licenses has traditionally
been reviewabIe" and that "any good law clerk can give [Berger]
ten thousand cases that will support" that proposition.18 0 But a
cautionary citation (e.g., "but see") to such cases did not accompany Professor Davis' citation of Gidney in his Treatise under
"Unreviewable Action." "Ten thousand cases" that negative such
a citation are like an iceberg of which a mariner through the
shoals of the. Davis "solution" deserved warning. Nor did Davis
point out that those cases cut a huge chunk--discretionary licensing covers a vast domain--out of his theory that arbitrariness is unreviewable where action "is by law committed to agency
action."
Not only did Professor Davis neglect to red-flag the "ten
thousand cases" that "any good law clerk" could furnish, but he
also cited at -least one "license" case to the contrary in his
Treatise:
A good example of a case in the present category ["Unreviewable Action"] is Sellas v. Kirk. The plaintiff sued to enjoin a
179.
180.

Davis, Postscript 829 n.30.
Ibid.

(Emphasis added.)
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range manager of the Department of the Interior from reducing
the plaintiff's permitted grazing on public lands.'8 1

In short, the Department had modified a grazing "license." Professor Davis quotes from the court's opinion: "the situation
would seem to be one where 'agency action is by law committed
to agency discretion,' and hence the action complained of here
would not be subject to judicial review .... ,,182 Thus we have

here a Davis citation which applies the second exception to preclude review of a "license" modification. 8 3 Then too, there is
his accolade to Ferry v. Udall 8 4 as a "well-considered" case.8

5

Ferry involved the propriety of a withdrawal of public lands
from sale. After quoting Davis' "solution," the court determined
that the question whether arbitrariness was reviewable turned
on whether the statute was "permissive" or "mandatory." Since
the statute did not require the Secretary to sell, but left the sale
in his discretion (i.e., "permitted" him to sell), the court held
that the withdrawal from sale was unreviewable.8 6 There is
no hint that the subject matter-sales of public lands as contrasted with "licenses"--was determinative, but only the broad
generalization that a "permissive" statute bars review. Many a
statute leaves the issuance of a "license" to the discretion of the
administrator, and under the "well-considered" view of Ferry v.
Udal, denials of licenses under statutes are not reviewable,
"ten thousand cases" to the contrary notwithstanding. The
Ferry holding that arbitrary action under a "permissive", i.e.,
discretionary, delegation is unreviewable is directly opposed to
the holding of the second Gidney case that it is reviewable; and
Professor Davis' endorsement of both cases exhibits unconcern
4 DAVIS, TREATISE § 28.16, at 83.
182. 220 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1952), quoted in 4 DAVIS, TREATISE
§ 28.16, at 83.
183. Professor Davis has stated that "upholding unreviewability of
questions of law, jurisdiction, and procedure is easiest in the batch of
cases involving denial of government bounties or benefits ... ." 4 DAVIS,
TREATISE § 28.18, at 98. The Supreme Court has sustained a decision that
a -state statute which permitted "administrative denial of a license to
practice medicine" was not reviewable. Id. at 101. Professor Davis also
cites Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1963), as holding that
"a denial by the Bureau of Land Management of a patent to a tract of
181.

land . . . is not reviewable."

Davis, Comment 23.

To distinguish be-

tween a "discretionary" patent and a "license" would slice it pretty thin.
Of course, I do not argue for such unreviewability; I merely cite Professor Davis himself against his "ten thousand cases."
.184. 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965).
185. Davis, Comment 20.
186. See Berger, Reply 799.
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with the need for a rationalizing principle.187
3) A purely denigratory tactic is Professor Davis' attribution to me of advocacy of "the Walter-Logan view (which is
essentially what Mr. Berger advocates), 188 i.e., "the early extreme position of trying to eliminate unreviewability [Berger's
position] ."1s9 That view, rejected by Congress, found little favor
in administrative law circles, so the attribution patently was
designed to discredit me. The attempt is utterly baseless. Under
the Walter-Logan Bill, the Davis Treatise tells us (quoting the
Attorney General), administrative "discretion ... would, to a
considerable extent, be transferred to the courts."'91 0 Throughout, my discussion has been confined to review of arbitrariness.
I have emphasized that the "vast bulk of the cases" governed
by the exception for action "by law committed to agency discretion" would fall into the area of "sound discretion" and would
therefore remain unreviewable. I have stressed that by the APA
Congress "desired to prevent the substitution of judicial judgment for the sound exercise of administrative discretion,"' 9' to
"insulate the exercise of 'discretion,' i.e., reasonable action, and
to make oppressive and unreasonable action reviewable."' 192
Manifestly this is far removed from espousal of the "extreme"
Walter-Logan proposal to eliminate all "unreviewability."
A second aspect of Professor Davis' attribution to me of
Walter-Logan views does him little more credit. Attorney General Jackson, he states, criticized the Walter-Logan Bill because
it
sweeps into the judicial hopper all manner of questions which
have never before been considered appropriate for judicial
review.
For example, such matters as the awarding of contracts,
[and] the acceptance or rejection of supplies ... .19
Professor Davis winds up this recital with the statement that
"even the minority [of the Attorney General's Committee] rejected the Walter-Logan view (which is essentially what Mr.
Berger advocates)."'14 In the Davis context this must be taken
to mean that I would sweep "into the judicial hopper" the sev187. See Davis' comment on Jaffe, supra note 150; Berger, Rejoinder

819-20; text accompanying note 172 supra; cf. note 19 supra. See also
subsection (4), infra.
188. Davis, Postscript826.
189. Ibid.
190. 4 DAvis, TmATISE § 28.08, at 40. (Emphasis added.)
191. Berger, Reply 788.
192. Ibid.
193. Davis, Postscript 826.
194. Ibid.
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eral categories enumerated by Jackson, which inferentially are
not presently covered by the APA. Now the several functions
enumerated by Attorney General Jackson were not exempted
from the APA by section 2; 195 they were exempted from "rulemaking" by section 4,196 but not from judicial review under
section 10, from which it may be deduced that they are reviewable unless exempted by the first or second exceptions of section
10. And since the claimed wholesale exemption of those functions was rejected in the APA, but for "rule-making," the exceptions of section 10 can hardly be read to exhibit an intention to
insulate arbitrariness in the exercise of those functions.
4) In my "Article" I had argued that abuse of "prosecutorial discretion" was reviewable 97 To refute my argument Professor Davis cited a case to show that the power to "withhold
prosecution is .
'clearly discretionary' and therefore judicially
unreviewable."' 9 In his recent review of Professor Jaffe's book,
Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 199 Professor Davis
takes Jaffe to task for non-mention of the view that prosecutorial "abuse of discretion" is reviewable, saying:
True, the Court does not say affirmatively that it will interfere for abuse of prosecutorial discretion [including decisions
"not to prosecute"], and therefore the opinion might be interpreted as leaving that question open. But I hope and expect
that the Court will interfere when it finds that such discretion
has been abused. The law of the present and of the future is
likely to be found in a decision just rendered by the Seventh
Circuit to that effect.
. The prosecuting power is an enormous one; it is much abused, and frequent injustice results
from its exercise. Since courts are
equipped to right some of
these wrongs, why shouldn't they 9200

Why indeed? But why-since his fenrent plea for review echoes
the view expressed in my "Article"--did he find it necessary to
195. Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.

§ 1001 (1964), excludes from the operation of the APA:

(1) agencies composed of representatives of the parties . . to
the disputes determined by them, (2) courts martial and military comrmssions, (3) military or naval authority exercised in
the field m time of war or in occupied territory, or (4) functions which by law expire on the termination of present hostilities . and the functions- conferred-by... Contract Settlement Act of 1944; Surplus Property Act of 1944...
196. Section 4 exempts from rule-making "(2) any matter relating

to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts

. . "; cf.

Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368, 371 (D.C.
Cir. 1961)
197. Berger, Article 68-69.
198. Davis, Comment 23.

199. Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review,

66 CoLum. L. REv. 635 (1966).
200. Id. at 649.
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refute my view? If the explanation is that the light belatedly
dawned on him, acknowledgment that his criticism of my view
was mistaken would have made a scholarly amend. One can
only marvel at Professor Davis' chameleon-like capacity to tailor
his views to the occasion.
The pages of the Davis "Postscript" are peppered with still
more shortcomings, but it would tax the reader's patience to detail them. To those who may consider some of the foregoing
examples carpingly critical, I commend Professor Davis' exhumation of minutiae with which he excoriated Dean Pound. Because, as he said of the Dean, the "conclusions of such an illustrous legal scholar are naturally welcomed by the American
20 1
Bar as the product of painstaking analysis and deep insight,"
we are entitled to demand that he himself should comply with
the most exacting standards of scholarship. Instead, he is guilty
of repeated distortion, baseless denigration, and misrepresentation. And all this merely to score a point, to defend a position
that-it must be increasingly apparent-is indefensible. Views
that require such defensive tactics must be suspect. And such
deplorable tactics, it is time to say bluntly, are unworthy of a
scholar-they strongly counsel those who rely upon Professor
Davis to peer behind his pontifications.

201. Davis, Dean Pound and Administrative Law, 42 CoLum. L. RBv.
89 (1942).

